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The Opioid Crisis: The Battle for Overdose Prevention Sites in Illinois
Haley Arnieri
I.

Introduction
After sixteen years of sobriety, actor Dax Shepard relapsed with prescription painkillers. 1

The Parenthood star had been taking prescribed Vicodin since 2012, with the knowledge of
family and sponsors, to deal with pain issues from a motorcycle accident. 2 The prescribed drug
use only recently became a problem in 2020 due to additional injuries to his hand and shoulder. 3
Until this point, Shepard had never bought non-prescribed opioids, but when his prescription
drugs were insufficient to fill his cravings, he started purchasing pills for the first time. 4 Shepard
knew he had an opioid problem when he began lying to everyone around him. Eventually, he
overcame his opioid dependence and feelings of fear and embarrassment with the help of his
loved ones.5 While Shepard is one of the lucky ones who was able to fight his opioid addiction,
many others are not so fortunate.
Since 1999, more than 841,000 people have died in the United States from a drug
overdose.6 In 2018, two out of three drug overdose deaths were from opioids.7 Like the rest of
the country, Illinois was not able to escape this public health crisis. Recently, COVID-19 has
exacerbated this fatal epidemic. 8 By July 2020, the number of people who died in Cook County

1

Karu F. Daniels, After 16 years of sobriety, Dax Shepard reveals relapse, opens up about his recent battle with
opioid addiction, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 25, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/ny-daxshephard-relapse-vicodin-addiction-armchair-expert-podcast-20200925-dafdqyhkurddxjovtne55lzzrq-story.html.
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Dax Shepard Opens Up About Addiction, DECISION POINT CTR. (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.decisionpointcenter.com/blog/2020/october/dax-shepard-opens-up-about-addiction/.
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Daniels, supra note 1.
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DECISION POINT CTR., supra note 2.
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Id.
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The Drug Overdose Epidemic: Behind the Numbers, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html (last updated Mar. 25, 2021).
7
Id.
8
Melissa Sanchez & Duaa Eldeib, Overdose Deaths Have Skyrocketed in Chicago, and the Coronavirus Pandemic
May Be Making It Worse, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/overdosedeaths-have-skyrocketed-in-chicago-and-the-coronavirus-pandemic-may-be-making-it-worse.

from opioids had doubled from the prior year.9 Opioid overdoses are the leading cause of injuryrelated death in the United States, but these deaths are preventable with the right resources. 10
Fighting the opioid crisis in Illinois is not an easy task. As opioid overdose deaths continue to
increase, policymakers will be pressured to devise and implement innovative solutions to combat
this urgent public health crisis. Supervised injection sites may be one of these innovative
solutions.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the history of the opioid crisis and the leading
factors contributing to the crisis. Part III introduces supervised injection sites as an innovative
solution to the opioid crisis, while examining the benefits and efficacy of such sites. This part
will also touch on the current state of supervised injection sites in the United States. Part IV
details Illinois’ efforts to address the opioid crisis, including its State of Illinois Opioid Action
Plan and its Overdose Prevention Site Community Engagement Project Report. Part V addresses
the legal status of supervised injection sites in the United States. This part will address the
federal “crack house” statute in conjunction with the Third Circuit’s recent decision, finding that
supervised injection sites violate federal law. Part VI will strive to analyze the best path forward
for establishing sites in Illinois and nationwide.

II.

History of the Opioid Crisis
Opioid overdose deaths have been steadily increasing over the past thirty years, with a

record number of almost 50,000 opioid-related deaths in 2019, a significant increase from

9

Duaa Eldeib & Melissa Sanchez, Opioid Overdoses Keep Surging in Chicago, Killing Black People on the West
Side, PROPUBLICA (July 14, 2020, 6:11 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/opioid-overdoses-keep-surging-inchicago-killing-black-people-on-the-west-side.
10
Colleen L. Barry et al., Language Matters in Combatting the Opioid Epidemic: Safe Consumption Sites Versus
Overdose Prevention Sites, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1157, 1157 (2018).

overdose deaths in 2017 and 2018. 11 While the final numbers from 2020 have not yet been
published, it is expected to be another record year.
Opioids are a class of drug naturally found in the opium poppy plant that reduce pain as
well as produce feelings of relaxation and euphoria. 12 When people take high doses of opioids
for an extended period, they risk developing opioid use disorder (OUD), a cyclical chronic
disease.13 Opioids include heroin and prescription pain relievers such as oxycodone,
hydrocodone, morphine, and synthetic fentanyl. 14
In the mid-1990s, pharmaceutical companies researched and developed opioid drugs due
to the allegations that the medical field was systemically undertreating pain. 15 OxyContin, a
morphine-like drug used to treat late-stage cancer pain and eventually non-cancer pain, was
approved in 1995 by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and was presented to the market
in January 1996.16 The misguided acceptance of opioid treatment appears to have originated
from a one-paragraph letter published in the 1980 edition of the New England Journal of
Medicine.17 This letter concluded from a single study of almost 12,000 hospitalized patients that,
"despite widespread use of narcotic drugs in hospitals, the development of addiction is rare in
medical patients with no history of addiction." 18 Consequently, this letter, which provided no
statistical evidence for its conclusion, was used in over 439 medical papers to support the idea

Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trendsstatistics/overdose-death-rates (last updated Jan. 29, 2021).
12
SUE PICKETT ET AL., ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN POTENTIAL, OVERDOSE PREVENTION SITE COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT PROJECT: JUNE 2020 REPORT, 3 (2020),
https://www.dhs.state.il.us/OneNetLibrary/27896/documents/OPS.pdf.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Nicholas A. Battista et al., Modeling the Prescription Opioid Epidemic, 81 BULL. MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY,
2258, 2258-59 (2019).
16
Abby E. Alpert et al., Origins of the Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring Impacts 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 26500, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26500/w26500.pdf.
17
Jack Hubbard et al., Opioid Abuse: The Fall of a Prince, 21 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 159, 167 (2018).
18
Id.
11

that opioids could be prescribed without fear of addiction. 19 This idea that opioids had a low
abuse potential would later be proved false. 20
Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin, used this letter in its expansive
marketing campaign to further promote the safety of opioid use.21 The initial marketing
campaign claimed the highly effective OxyContin had low abuse potential and was safer than
other opioid drugs.22 Some marketing materials failed to mention anything about the potential for
addiction.23 Due to these misleading reassurances from OxyContin’s manufacturer, health care
providers’ fears eased, resulting in more opioid prescriptions than ever before.24 This marked the
beginning of the modern-day opioid crisis.25 In the time frame between 1990 and 2008, overdose
death rates, opioid pharmaceutics sales, and addiction treatment admissions related to opioids all
dramatically increased. 26
In addition to the marketing efforts of Purdue Pharma, scholars have identified two other
factors that have contributed to the opioid crisis.27 In 2001, the Joint Commission classified pain
as the “fifth vital sign” in its newest edition of Pain Management Standards. 28 This new
classification mandated physicians to ask every patient about their pain level, which led to a
dramatic increase in the number of opioid prescriptions written as well as opioid-related
overdoses.29 The second factor that contributed to the opioid crisis was the government’s recent
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Id.
Id. at 168.
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Id. at 167.
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Alpert et al., supra note 16, at 6.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Hubbard et al., supra note 17, at 168.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28 Id. at 168; Kristina Fiore, Opioid Crisis: Scrap Pain as 5th Vital Sign?, MEDPAGE TODAY (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/publichealth/57336. The other vital signs are heart rate, blood
pressure, respiratory rate, and temperature.
29
Hubbard et al., supra note 17, at 168-69.
20

shift towards patient-centric care.30 In an innocent attempt to improve patient care, the
government created a patient satisfaction survey which had an unintended impact on the opioid
crisis.31 At this point, patients had come to expect opioid prescriptions for any level of pain, and
those physicians who did not live up to that expectation achieved poor survey results.32
Consequently, because these survey ratings were correlated to the salary or retention, physicians
often issued opioid prescriptions to achieve better ratings, even when it was unnecessary. 33
These factors paved the way for three waves of opioid overdose deaths that define the
opioid epidemic.34 The first wave was from 1997 to 2002, when the United States saw the
prescription rate of morphine increase by 73%, the prescription rate of fentanyl increase by
226%, and the prescription rate of oxycodone increase by 402%.35 In 2010, the illicit use of
heroin caused the second wave of opioid-related overdose deaths.36 After two decades of
increased opioid prescriptions, the original formulation of OxyContin was removed from the
market, leaving many patients addicted and nowhere to turn other than the streets.37 Many of
those addicted to prescription opioids turned to illicit heroin because the drug was more readily
available, less expensive, and offered a more potent high; thus, leading to a significant increase
in heroin overdose deaths. 38 The third wave began in 2013, when illicitly manufactured fentanyl,
a synthetic opioid, became more widely available on the streets. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid

30

See id. at 169.
Id.
32
Aleksandra Zgierska et al., Patient Satisfaction, Prescription Drug Abuse, and Potential Unintended
Consequences, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1377, 1378 (2012).
33
Id.
34
Understanding the Epidemic, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last updated Mar. 17, 2021); When Did the Opioid Crisis
Start?, BAART PROGRAMS (Nov. 2, 2020), https://baartprograms.com/when-did-the-opioid-crisis-start/.
35
Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 224 (2009).
36
Alpert et al., supra note 16, at 4.
37
Id.
38
When Did the Opioid Crisis Start?, supra note 34.
31

that is fifty to a hundred times more potent than morphine and has been the main driver for the
most recent increase in opioid overdose deaths. 39 These drug-specific trends indicate that the
introduction of OxyContin had long-term effects on the opioid crisis in the United States. 40
Opioid addiction has become a global epidemic and a domestic national health crisis 41
requiring creative solutions. The federal government has taken measures, albeit ineffective, to
address the opioid crisis, such as enacting drug abuse legislation, creating regulatory agencies,
and increasing law enforcement efforts.42 Despite all of the endeavors from the federal
government to reschedule opioids and employ the assistance of law enforcement and public
health agencies to target and prosecute offenders, 43 opioid overdose deaths have continued to
rise. With morbidity and mortality rates at unprecedented levels, it is time that policymakers and
health care workers turn to innovative solutions.
III.

Supervised Injection Sites
Opioid users who inject opioids are particularly susceptible to overdose and death, as

opposed to other methods of consumption.44 The most popular method of heroin consumption is
injection by a hypodermic needle. This type of abuse provides the fastest onset of intense
pleasure because the drug immediately integrates with the bloodstream and travels to the brain

39

Fentanyl, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyl.html
(last updated Feb. 16, 2021).
40
Alpert et al., supra note 16, at 26.
41
What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html (last updated Feb. 19, 2021).
42
See Robert Parker Tricarico, A Nation in the Throes of Addiction: Why A National Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program Is Needed Before It Is Too Late, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 117, 125 (2016).
43
See Id.
44
RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND
INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 191-192 (2017) (“It is well substantiated that drugs
used by . . . injection, in particular, enter the bloodstream and hasten the opioid's crossing of the blood–brain barrier,
generating a faster onset of action, which in turn is associated with a greater risk of overdose and of developing
OUD.”).

without requiring the drug to first be broken down by digestion. 45 Not only are people who inject
drugs highly susceptible to overdose, but they are also at high risk of acquiring blood-borne
illnesses. Between 2004 and 2014, there was a 133% increase in the spread of Hepatitis C
infections.46 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has found that the recent
sharp increase in cases of Hepatitis C is associated with increases in opioid injection.47 The
innovative solution to this injection opioid crisis is supervised injection sites (also called “safer
injection facilities,” “safe consumption sites,” or “overdose prevention sites”).
Supervised injection sites are legally sanctioned locations that provide a sanitary place for
people to inject pre-obtained drugs under the supervision of medical professionals who can
administer the overdose reversal drug, Naloxone. 48 These sites aim to increase the safety of
people who inject opioids and minimize the negative social consequences of injecting drugs in
public spaces.49 These sites can play a vital role in a public health approach to drug policy as
they have been shown to reduce overdose deaths, HIV transmission, and Hepatitis C infections.50
These supervised injection sites can provide a non-judgmental environment for safeguarded
injecting, appropriate guidance and equipment to reduce harm, proper disposal of used needles,
and onsite or connections to medical and social services.51 The most important function of these
sites is the ability to connect drug users with abuse treatment and rehabilitation services. 52

45

See Anil Aggrawal, Narcotic Drugs: The King of Narcotics (May 1995), https://www.opioids.com/narcoticdrugs/chapter-3.html.
46
Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Increase in Hepatitis C Infections Linked to Worsening
Opioid Crisis (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2017/hepatitis-c-and-opioidinjection-press-release.html.
47
Id.
48
Alex H. Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation's Opioid Epidemic: Lessons from an Unsanctioned
Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 919, 919 (2017).
49
Id.
50
Barry et al., supra note 10.
51
Kral & Davidson, supra note 48.
52
Kristen Maye & Kassandra Frederique, Supervised Injection Facilities Are Safe Houses, Not Crack Houses,
HUFFPOST (June 21, 2016, 12:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/supervised-injection-facilities_b_10593978.

Supervised injection sites have already been implemented with great success in Canada
and Western Europe, with approximately 120 facilities operating in ten countries worldwide.53
Unfortunately, supervised injection sites have not been implemented in the United States due in
part to low public support.54 But, as can be seen from abroad, once implemented, these sites have
gained high community support. 55 In neighborhoods with these sites, there have been
improvements in community health and safety, including decreased rates of public injection and
improperly discarded needles, drug-related crime and violence, and the need for ambulance
services for opioid overdoses.56 Recently, however, based on this evidentiary support,
community activists have started to solicit support for implementing these supervised injection
sites in the United States.
In 2014, a social service agency engaged in civil disobedience and activism opened an
unsanctioned supervised injection site in an undisclosed urban area of the United States. 57 This
unsanctioned site collected qualitative data from an anonymous survey to evaluate the impact of
the site, and the resulting data was subsequently reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the University of California, San Diego. 58 The site, which is invitation only, is
open five days per week for four to six hours a day. 59 Between 2014 and 2019, a total of 10,514
injections were administered at the site, with only 33 opioid-related overdoses, which were all
successfully reversed by Naloxone. 60 In the five years of operation, no fatalities occurred. 61

Supervised Consumption Sites, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, https://drugpolicy.org/issues/supervised-consumptionservices (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
54
Barry et al., supra note 10.
55
Kral & Davidson, supra note 48.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 919-20.
59
Id. at 920.
60
Alex H. Kral et al., Evaluation of an Unsanctioned Safe Consumption Site in the United States, 383 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 589, 589 (2020).
61
Id.
53

While there are no legally sanctioned supervised injection sites in the United States at this time,
the support for them is growing. Leaders from over ten states have begun to discuss and support
the implementation of supervised injection sites as an innovative intervention to this public
health crisis.62
IV.

Illinois’ Efforts to Address the Opioid Crisis
A. State of Illinois Opioid Action Plan
The opioid crisis has hit Illinois, especially the city of Chicago, very hard. Over the past

decade, opioid-related deaths have increased drastically in Chicago. 63 In 2017, almost 800
Chicagoans died from opioid overdoses.64 The opioid overdose death rate is over one and a half
times higher in Chicago than in the rest of Illinois. 65 Chicago’s opioid overdose death rates from
fentanyl and heroin are over five and six times higher than the opioid overdose death rate from
prescription opioids, respectively. 66 In 2017, as a collective call-to-action to save lives, the State
of Illinois developed the Illinois Opioid Action Plan (SOAP), establishing the Governor’s Opioid
Prevention and Intervention Task Force (Task Force), pursuant to Executive Order 2017-05.67
Based on the current rate of opioid-related deaths, Illinois projected that the opioid
epidemic would take the lives of more than 2,700 Illinoisians in 2020. 68 To halt this escalation,

62

See United States v. Safehouse, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/us-v-safehouse (last visited Oct. 24,
2021).
63
Tamara Rushovich, Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Current Epidemic in Chicago, CHI. DEP’T OF PUB.
HEALTH,
https://www.chicagohan.org/documents/14171/257778/TRushovich+Opioid+Overdose+Understanding+the+current
+epidemic+in+Chicago.pdf/9d88e284-1bf5-4afd-a94d-1211ffef07ab (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, STATE OF ILLINOIS COMPREHENSIVE OPIOID DATA REPORT, 3 (2017),
https://news.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/publicationsdoil-opioid-data-report_0.pdf.
68
BRUCE RAUNER, ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, STATE OF ILLINOIS OPIOID ACTION PLAN 3 (2017),
https://dph.illinois.gov/content/dam/soi/en/web/idph/files/publications/illinois-opioid-action-plan-sept-6-2017final.pdf.

the SOAP set out to reduce this number of projected opioid-related deaths by one-third.69 The
SOAP’s three primary efforts focused on preventing the further spread of the opioid crisis,
providing evidence-based treatment and recovery services to Illinois residents with OUD, and
averting overdose deaths. 70 These three pillars encompassed six priorities, which were addressed
through nine evidence-based strategies.71 The six priorities included: safer prescribing and
dispensing; education and stigma reduction; monitoring and communication; access to care;
supporting justice-involved populations; and rescue. 72 The nine evidence-based strategies
proposed to execute these priorities were: increase Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP) use;
reduce high-risk opioid prescribing; increase the accessibility of information and resources;
increase the impact of prevention programming; strengthen data collection, analysis, and sharing;
increase access to care; increase diversion and deflection program capacity; increase naloxone
training and access; and decrease overdose deaths after release from institutions.73 The Task
Force collaborated with the Illinois Opioid Crisis Response Advisory Council (Council) to
formulate a detailed implementation plan to execute these strategies, which were implemented in
late 2017.74
Since the release of SOAP, the government effectuated multiple legislative reforms
aimed at addressing the opioid crisis in Illinois. Effective January 1, 2018, Public Act 100-0564
promotes safer opioid prescribing and dispensing by requiring prescribers with an Illinois
controlled substances license to register with the Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP).75 The

69

Id.
Id.
71
Id.
72
ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, STATE OF ILLINOIS OPIOID ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 4 (2020),
https://www.dhs.state.il.us/OneNetLibrary/27896/documents/SOAP_Implementation_Report_October_2020.pdf.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 3.
75
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/314.5(C-5) (2019); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/316(F) (2019).
70

PMP is an electronic database that collects daily information on controlled substance
prescriptions in Illinois and enhances prescribers’ and dispensers’ capacity to review a patient’s
prescription history in order to give proper care.76 Later in 2018, Public Act 100-0861 was
passed, allowing greater access to the PMP by allowing providers to designate access on their
behalf.77 This was implemented to allow prescribers to focus their time on patient care rather
than on administrative issues.78 In January 2019, Public Act 100-1106 was enacted, which
requires three hours of continuing education on safe opioid-prescribing practices for controlled
substance licensed prescribers before they can renew their prescription license.79 In August 2019,
the Overdose Prevention and Harm Reduction Act went into effect, which authorized opening
needle and hypodermic syringe access programs in Illinois. 80 Previously, needle exchange
programs could not be established in Illinois unless they were part of lawful research, teaching,
or chemical analysis. 81 Now there are seven needle and syringe access programs statewide. 82
Despite these accomplishments, the Task Force did not meet its overall goal to reduce
opioid deaths by 33% in three years. 83 Illinois saw some progress in 2018, with the Illinois
Department of Public Health (IDPH) announcing the first decrease (1.6%) in opioid-related
deaths since 2013.84 Unfortunately, IDPH’s 2019 and 2020 provisional mortality data show a 3%
increase in opioid-related deaths.85 Accordingly, in 2020 the government reevaluated the 2017

Frequently Asked Questions: Registering and Accessing the PMP, ILL. ST. MED. SOC’Y,
https://www.isms.org/pmpquestions/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
77
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/316(g) (2019).
78
ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 72, at 10.
79
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/315.5 (2019).
80
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 710/5(a) (2019).
81
New Illinois Laws: Health and Justice Highlights, TASC (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.tasc.org/tascweb/article.aspx?ID=372.
82
See SSP Locations, NASEN, https://nasen.org/map/?go=process (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
83
ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 72, at 45.
84
Id.
85
Id.
76

SOAP, taking into account new challenges Illinois faces, such as the influx of fentanyl, the
impact of COVID-19, and the growing racial and social disparities of the crisis.86 Executive
Order 2020-02 put strategies into place to build on Illinois’ progress and focus on new areas,
such as social equity and harm reduction. 87 The Order also established the Governor’s Overdose
Prevention and Recovery Steering Committee to create new policies and programs with the help
the Opioid Crisis Response Advisory Council.88
B. Overdose Prevention Site Community Engagement Project Report
Focusing on engaging highly impacted communities, Illinois has recently become
amenable to the innovative solution of opening an overdose prevention site in Chicago. In
January 2020, Illinois House Representative La Shawn K. Ford introduced House Bill 4071,
creating the Safer Consumption Services Act, which would allow IDPH to approve overdose
prevention sites in Illinois.89 Later that year, the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS)
announced the release of the Overdose Prevention Site (OPS) Community Engagement Project
Report (Report) and next steps for opioid overdose prevention sites in Chicago’s West Side
neighborhood.90 Chicago’s West Side neighborhood has one of Illinois’ highest fatal and nonfatal opioid overdose rates, totaling 2,408 and 2,568 fatal and non-fatal opioid overdoses in 2018
and 2019, respectively.91
Despite COVID-19, state officials were able to engage West Side community members in
initial discussions about overdose prevention sites and gather valuable information on their

86

Id.
Id. at 46.
88
Id.
89
H.R. 4071, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2020).
90
See PICKETT ET AL., supra note 12.
91
Id. at 4.
87

perspectives of these sites.92 The OPS Community Engagement Project concentrated on
communicating with West Side residents, business owners, faith leaders, healthcare and social
service providers, law enforcement, elected officials, recovering opioid users, and current opioid
users to gather their concerns about OPSs and to educate them on OPSs.93 The Report found that
86% of the West Side community believe an OPS would be beneficial to their community. 94 The
Report indicated that West Side community members thought that potential benefits of an OPS
would include reduced overdose deaths, reduced public drug use and infectious disease risks,
improved public safety, and increased access to substance use treatment and recovery support
services.95 The Report also found that 22% of survey participants had concerns about opening an
OPS, some of their reasoning included the fear of increased drug selling, public drug use, and
opioid overdoses.96 The IDHS mentioned in the Report that the next steps in creating an OPS
would start with creating a community advisory council to lead the planning activities.97
After all of these efforts, it appeared as though there could be light at the end of the
tunnel for the opioid crisis in Chicago. However, this newfound hope would not last long, as a
new roadblock stood in the way: The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
day after the Third Circuit ruled that overdose prevention sites would violate federal law, the
Illinois 101st General Assembly adjourned sine die, leaving House bill 4071 dead. 98
Consequently, on January 13, 2021, House Representative La Shawn K. Ford, this time with

92

See id.
Id. at 5.
94
Id. at 9.
95
Id. at 10.
96
Id. at 12.
97
IDHS Announces Release of Community Engagement Project Report And Next Steps For Opioid Overdose
Prevention Sites In Chicago, RIVERBENDER (Aug. 24, 2020, 3:18 PM),
https://www.riverbender.com/articles/details/idhs-announces-release-of-community-engagement-project-report-andnext-steps-for-opioid-overdose-prevention-sites-in-chicago-43929.cfm.
98
H.R. 4071, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2020).
93

House Representative Carol Ammons, reintroduced the Safer Consumption Services Act as
House Bill 0110 in the 102nd General Assembly.99
V.

Current Federal Roadblocks
A. The Crack House Statute
The biggest obstacle for Illinois and other states to introduce supervised injection sites is

the federal crack house statute. 100 Half a century ago, it became clear that the United States had a
drug abuse problem.101 To tackle this national problem, Congress consolidated many drug laws
into a single scheme: the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 102 An
important component of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act is the Title
II section, the Controlled Substances Act (Act), which broadly regulates illegal drugs. Initially,
the Act did not address people who opened their property for drug activity. But then, in the
1980s came the height of the crack epidemic and the surging rise of “crack houses”103 (houses or
apartments where crack cocaine was manufactured, sold, or used).104 Congress amended the
Controlled Substances Act in 1986 to address this issue, adding 21 USC § 856: the federal “crack
house” statute. This statute was designed to punish those who used their property to run drug
businesses.105
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H.R. 110, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
See 21 U.S.C. § 856.
101
Rob Griffitts, Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act & Cannabis, MGA (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://masur.com/lawtalk/a-look-at-the-controlled-substances-act-and-cannabis/.
102
Id.
103
Jacob A. Epstein, Molly and the Crack House Statute: Vulnerabilities of a Recuperating Music Industry, 23 U.
MIA. BUS. L. REV. 95, 103 (2014).
104
Crack house, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crack%20house (last visited
Oct. 24, 2021).
105
U.S. v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995).
100

Specifically, Section (a)(1) of this statute originally made it illegal to “knowingly open or
maintain any place, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled
substance.”106 Section (a)(2) originally made it unlawful to:
manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner, lessee,
agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, or
make available for use, with or without compensation, the building, room, or
enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or
using a controlled substance. 107
Congress later extended this crime in 2003, by further broadening the language to reach even
temporary drug premises.108 Section (a)(1) of the crack house statute now reads as: “it shall be
unlawful to knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether permanently or
temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled
substance.”109 Section (a)(2) now makes it illegal to
manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as an
owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without
compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance.110
Although Congress passed this legislation to shut down crack houses specifically, the
language of the statute reaches far beyond them.

B. United States v. Safehouse
The latest reach of the statute beyond crack houses concerns the opening of the first
overdose prevention site in the United States. Between 2017 and 2019, 3,483 unintentional drug-
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related deaths occurred in Philadelphia. 111 Ready for a change, a nonprofit group in Philadelphia,
Safehouse, sought to open a safe-injection site in 2019, but was quickly met with legal
challenges from the federal government. 112 Not only would Safehouse provide a range of
overdose prevention services, such as drug treatment and counseling, referrals to social services,
and used syringe exchanges, but it would also provide consumption and observation rooms. 113
The federal government sued Safehouse, seeking a declaratory judgment that Safehouse’s
consumption room would violate §856(a)(2) of the crack house statute. 114 The district court ruled
in favor of Safehouse, holding that §856(a)(2) does not apply to Safehouse’s consumption
room.115 The district court held that someone violates § 856(a)(2) only if his purpose is for others
to manufacture, distribute, or use illegal drugs on the premises, finding that Safehouse’s purpose
was to offer medical care, encourage drug treatment, and save lives.116 The federal government
appealed to the Third Circuit of Appeals.
As United States v. Safehouse moved to the Third Circuit of Appeals, ten states,
including Illinois, filed amicus briefs in support of Safehouse. 117 Despite this overwhelming
support, the Third Circuit ruled against Safehouse in a 2-1 decision.118 The case turned on the
construction and application of § 856(a)(2)’s last phrase: “for the purpose of….” 119 Safehouse
argued that in order to violate § 856(a)(2), Safehouse itself would need to have the purpose that
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its visitors use drugs. Conversely, the government argued that only the visitors need to have the
purpose of using drugs. Therefore, Safehouse just needs to open its site to visitors it knows
intentionally intend to use drugs there.120 Engaging in a statutory construction analysis, the Court
agreed with the latter position, finding that the text of the statute focuses on the third party’s
purpose, not Safehouse’s.121 The Court held that in order to violate § 856(a)(2), “the government
must show only that the defendant’s tenant or visitor had a purpose to manufacture, distribute, or
use drugs.”122 The Court came to this logical conclusion by looking at how paragraphs (a)(1) and
(a)(2) are written and structured.123
The Court explained that paragraph (a)(1) bars a person from operating a place for his
own purpose of illegal drug activity, requiring just one party.124 The Court further explains that
paragraph (a)(2)’s language, on the other hand, requires at least two actors: adding the third
party,125 holding that the third party is the one who must act for the purpose of illegal drug
activity.126 The Court explains that applying section (a)(2) as Safehouse does would make
paragraph (a)(2) redundant of (a)(1).127 The Court further notes that six other circuits, including
the Seventh Circuit, agree with this reading of the sections. 128
When the Court applied the statute to Safehouse, it found that safe-injection sites violate
section 856(a)(2) because its visitors will have a “significant purpose” of drug activity.129 The
Court notes that the statute requires the actor to have a significant purpose of drug activity, but it
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need not be his sole purpose. 130 The Court explains that Safehouse’s main attraction is its
consumption room; therefore, its visitors will have the significant purpose of drug activity. This
is clear by its name: Safehouse calls it a “consumption room” or “safe-injection site.”131 The
Third Circuit concludes that although the opioid crisis may call for innovative solutions, safeinjection sites violate federal law, and the Court cannot and will not rewrite the statute. 132
The dissent found that Safehouse cannot violate the statute because it does not have the
requisite “purpose” per the statute’s language.133 In the dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Jane R.
Roth found that the Majority’s statutory construction would create absurd results.134 On February
26, 2021, Safehouse petitioned the Third Circuit of Appeals for a rehearing en banc based on this
being a legal question of first impression and of substantial public importance. 135 As expected,
amicus briefs were filed in support of a rehearing en banc by many states, including Illinois. 136
While this decision is not binding on Illinois courts, there could still be fallout from this opinion,
making it much more difficult for Illinois to open its opioid overdose prevention site. Safehouse
can appeal to the Supreme Court but will need to weigh the potential risk, as a decision affirming
the appeals ruling would set a precedent for the entire country.
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VI.

The Road Ahead for Supervised Injection Sites in Illinois
“Though the opioid crisis may call for innovative solutions, local innovations may not

break federal law.”137 Circuit Judge Bibas pointed out that this harsh truth can be especially
tough to accept when one has the best intentions. Opening a supervised injection site in Illinois
will be no easy task and will take time as there are multiple roadblocks in the way. But, even
with the setback of the Third Circuit’s ruling, there are still multiple pathways ahead for Illinois.
As I see it, Illinois has three options: (1) delay opening its opioid overdose prevention site
and wait to see if Safehouse appeals to the Supreme Court, hopefully obtaining a binding ruling
that supervised injections sites are legal; (2) proceed with plans to open its opioid overdose
prevention site, as the Third Circuit’s ruling is not binding in Illinois and hope the Biden
administration does not prosecute; or (3) hold off on opening its opioid overdose prevention site
and lobby policymakers in Congress to carve out an exception for supervised injections sites in
the crack house statute. I find the last option to be the best choice as the goal of these sites is to
use an innovative approach to combat and end this deadly epidemic.
Appealing to the United States Supreme Court is a risky move, although it can benefit
everyone trying to open a supervised injection site. A ruling from the Supreme Court that
opening supervised injection sites would not break federal law would create binding law across
the country, an outcome that is wanted and needed. However, getting in front of the Supreme
Court can be quite difficult. The Supreme Court receives more than 7,000 petitions requesting a
writ of certiorari each year, and of those, approximately 100-150 cases are granted.138 Also, time
is of the essence, as more than 100 people die needlessly each day in the United States from
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drug-related overdoses.139 Each day that goes by waiting for an appeal to be granted and a
decision to be made, another 100 lives are lost. At this rate, the country can no longer afford to
wait to implement critical life-saving harm reduction services. Unfortunately, it usually takes
about a year or more for a Supreme Court case to advance from granting a petition to a
decision.140 Not to mention there is always the risk that the Supreme Court finds that supervised
injections sites do violate federal law, thereby becoming the law of the land rather than
persuasive authority in Illinois. Although this is an option Illinois can take, it is not a preferable
one.
Another path for Illinois to take is to move forward with opening its overdose prevention
site in hopes that the Department of Justice (DOJ) decides not to prosecute them. This could be a
viable option as there has been a recent change to the presidential administration. The Trump
administration led the legal action against Philadelphia’s safe-injection site.141 But as of January
20, 2021142 the Biden administration is in power. The timing of the Third Circuit’s decision is
unfortunate and makes things for Illinois much more complicated. If the court waited eight days
to rule, Biden’s Department of Justice would have had the opportunity to withdraw the case, thus
leaving the final ruling on the issue from the district court. Safehouse would have been able to
proceed with opening the United States’ first safe-injection site, and Illinois would not have this
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persuasive authority looming over its efforts. Although this was not the case, the Biden
administration still can effect change.
When President Biden was a U.S. Senator, he was an outspoken proponent of the War on
Drugs and co-sponsored the crack house statute. 143 Biden’s championing of a broad application
of the crack house statute engendered the challenges supervised injections sites are currently
facing.144 However, in recent years, President Biden has shifted his stance on addiction and
substance abuse, seeming to take a much more progressive and evidence-based approach to drug
policy.145 But, President Biden has yet to publicly express his viewpoint on supervised injection
sites.146
As is customary when a presidential administration changes, U.S. Attorney William
McSwain, who led the charge against Safehouse, resigned from his position as the chief federal
law enforcement officer in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on January 22, 2021. 147
McSwain’s resignation opened the door for President Biden to appoint a U.S. Attorney who is a
civil rights and criminal justice reform advocate. 148 Because prosecutors have discretion, this
new U.S. Attorney can circumvent the Third Circuit’s decision by not enforcing prosecution on
anyone who opens a supervised injection site in Philadelphia. Similarly, the Biden administration
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can implement this strategy nationwide through the rest of his U.S. Attorney appointments. In
2013, the DOJ issued the Cole memo, which ordered prosecutors not to raid marijuana
dispensaries in states that legalized marijuana. 149 Biden’s DOJ can issue a similar
nonenforcement memo for supervised injection sites. If Biden’s DOJ were to issue this
enforcement memo, Illinois could proceed with its plans without fear of being prosecuted.
But the risk remains that as the presidential administrations changes every four to eight
years, so could their viewpoints on overdose prevention sites. If Illinois were to open a
supervised injection site during the Biden administration, there is no guarantee that the next
administration would not prosecute them under the crack house statute. Illinois may feel that is a
risk worth taking and try its chances in court. However, as the Third Circuit noted, the Seventh
Circuit agrees with its reading of the two paragraphs in § 856(a).150 The Seventh Circuit can
certainly come out a different way. The goal is to be able to operate supervised injection sites
lawfully and permanently, and this pathway does not guarantee this goal.
The best path for Illinois to take to ensure that it can open its overdose prevention site
lawfully and permanently is to lobby Congress to carve out an exception in the crack house
statute. Courts are not arbiters of policy and cannot rewrite the statute. It is clear that supervised
injection sites have a vast amount of support nationwide. 151 Congress chose to fight the opioid
crisis with a flat ban. 152 What seemed rational at the time no longer holds water, and I believe
many policymakers see that.
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For the first time ever, Congress has weighed in on the issue of safe consumption sites.
On December 27, 2020, Congress passed stimulus legislation that included direction to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA) to examine and release a report on the potential public health impact of safe
consumption sites.153 The time is ripe for Illinois and the rest of the nation to lobby Congress to
amend the crack house statute to exclude supervised injection sites.
In its efforts to appeal to Congress, Illinois and others should be aware of their language
when promoting supervised injection sites. A growing literature suggests that strategic
communication approaches can reduce the stigma toward opioid users and increase policy
support for these types of innovative solutions. 154 Illinois should frame the solution as an
“overdose prevention site” rather than a “safe consumption site” or “supervised injection site.”
Framed this way, by emphasizing how many people are dying, there is potential to increase the
number of people who view the policy as acceptable. 155 On the other hand, “safe consumption
sites” highlight making an illegal activity safer for a highly stigmatized population, deterring
potential supporters. 156 Amending the crack house statute to carve out an exception for
supervised injection sites will provide Illinois with lawful authority to combat the opioid crisis
with supervised injection sites. Taking this road will allow Illinois policymakers to pass the Safer
Consumption Services Act (House Bill 0110) without fear of federal backlash. Illinois will not
have to succumb to court rulings based on persuasive influence from sister circuits. Nor will
Illinois live in fear that a new administration will prosecute it in later years.
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Conclusion
There is no consensus and no easy answer to what will end the opioid epidemic. But
overdose prevention sites are a step in the right direction. Although supervised injection sites
may not solve the opioid crisis on their own, the empirical evidence of the efficacy and benefits
of these sites are strong.157 Once Illinois has implemented its overdose prevention site, the state
will begin to heal from some of the detrimental effects of the opioid crisis, most notably by
decreasing the number of overdose deaths. It is time for the federal government to allow states to
implement innovative solutions to this crisis without legal barriers in their way.
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